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Abstract
This article provides a comprehensive picture of the National Transfer Accounts
(NTA), a project that aims at measuring how people produce, consume, save, and
share economic resources at every age. It stands today with a unique dataset that
includes 47 countries from around the world, permitting a comparative understand-
ing of economic flows within and between generations and over time.
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1 Introduction
The National Transfer Accounts (NTA) was born in 2004 out of a wide discussion
among researchers who recognized the eminent impact of population dynamics and
age structure on the economy. These researchers met in Berkeley, USA, at a work-
shop co-chaired by professors Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason1. It stands today
as a well-established empirical tool for understanding the generational economy,
with data available already for 47 countries around the globe, matching in their
aggregates the widely-used System of National Accounts (SNA).
The NTA recognizes in its most basic idea that there exists a relationship between
individuals who have economic resources to give and those who need them. It stems
from the irrevocable finding that people incur a life cycle deficit during their youth
and old age, when their consumption exceeds their labor income, and a life cycle
surplus during their working years when their labor income more than covers their
consumption. This rather simple but powerful finding creates an eventual resource
reallocation between generations and across time that can be consistently quantified
and linked to the economic evolution of every society.
The strength of this accounting project, and indeed its theoretical niche in life cycle
theory, is that it adds a another more subtle dimension to how we see economic
flows. Whereas classic economic theories segregate the market into supply and
demand, for instance, life cycle theory looks at the economy through the lens of
age: dependents who need various forms of financing to survive and thrive, and
workers who finance them. The magnitude of these flows when seen through age
is remarkable. In 2003 children in the USA were the recipients of a total sum of
private transfers, both inter and intra household, equivalent to 9% of the country’s
nominal GDP; Indian children, on the other hand, enjoyed a much larger portion,
equivalent to 15% of their country’s GDP. Although the elderly in Germany, for
example, continue to be net givers of private transfers, however small, they received
public transfers equivalent to 10% of the country’s GDP in 2004, which is starkly
different to the meager 1% received by Mexican elders. These flows, captured by the
NTA in a standardized manner are emblematic of not only demographic differences
between countries, but also of the varying roles of the state, the markets and of
courses families, all of which influence resource reallocations.
The rest of this article is structured as follows: Section (2) gives the history and
the context that lead to the eventual creation of the National Transfer Accounts;
Section (3) shows how the flows are quantified and how the data is collected; Section
(4) scans the general key findings of the work that has been done by the various
teams around the world; Section (5) tackles some of the limitations and challenges
facing the project, and finally; Section (6) concludes.
1The workshop was co-sponsored by the Center for the Economics and Development of Aging
of the University of California at Berkeley, and the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii, with
the support of the US National Institute on Aging.
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2 Context and History
The impact of population dynamics on larger economy has gained much traction
during the 20th century. Despite the much earlier work by Malthus [65] on the neg-
ative and cyclical relationship between population growth and income per capita,
demographers and economists of the 20th century paid closer attention to under-
standing the particular characteristics, determinants and consequences of demo-
graphic change, in an attempt to draw general trends of population change and
effect.
In his pioneering work, Thompson [93] argued that there exists a relationship be-
tween a country’s demographic phase, seen through birth and death rates, and its
industrial (or economic) development. Countries more advanced in their industrial
development, with falling fertility and mortality rates, for instance, as seen in West-
ern Europe at the time, would face an eventual decline in their populations. Those
with neither of these two rates falling, seen in Japan, India and Russia and the time,
would face a Malthusian trap. Landry [53], coming not long thereafter, noted simi-
lar demographic shifts based on birth and death rates and was the first to coin the
term “demographic revolution,” later known as the “demographic transition,” based
on the idea that there exists a general population path that all countries witness as
they move from high fertility and mortality regimes to low ones (Kirk [49]).
Towards the second half of the 20th century, however, concern grew among aca-
demics and politicians about the rapid population growth rates seen and recorded
worldwide. Between 1950 and the early 1970s, world population grew at an av-
erage of 2% per year reaching 3 billion inhabitants by 1960. While it took the
modern world more than 1,800 years to reach its first billion inhabitants, it took
it only 125 years to reach its second billion and merely 30 years to reach its third,
spurring a much heated debate on the developmental consequences of such rapid
growth rates, particularly for low-income countries. Thinkers of the time warned
of potential food and land shortages as demand increases, of the deterioration of
income per capita and capital formation, of the potential rise of unemployment, the
degradation of natural resources and the general plummet of human welfare. Coale
and Hoover [28], for example, took the particular case of India at the time to warn
of these consequences. The Pearson Report [1] alluded to the effect on poverty and
recommended explicit aid for low-income countries to control and stabilize their
rapid population growth rates. The Rockefeller Commission [2] stressed issues re-
lating to population density and resource scarcity in the US, informing policy on
the role of education, child care services and family planning.
The World Bank policies from the 1970s onwards, in fact, strongly supported this
rather pessimistic view of global population growth and focused noticeably on fund-
ing and managing family planning and education programs in low-developing coun-
tries. The fear of the effect of population growth on economic development was
perceived in a noticeably somber manner, despite the work of Ester Boserup [20] in
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the 1960s, for instance, who argued that population growth and density rates were
among the main factors of technology take-up rates and the kick-start of modern
development, and despite also the much earlier work of Clark [27] who argued that
until a society reaches some level of population density that provoked agricultural
development, civilization and economic progress would not be possible.
Indeed, the World Bank’s literature at the time seemed to has been dominated by
the view that population growth control is a necessary condition to sustain human
welfare and human rights (see the World Bank internal working papers published in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, [15] and [3]). Such world views eventually culminated
in the World Population Plan of Action [4], published following the United Nations’
World Population Conference, outlining some of the main concerns of population
increase and the need for national and international policies to curb its negative
consequences.
However, as the world population growth rate reached its peak in the mid-1960’s,
international concerns shifted towards another issue: population aging. In the
Western world in particular, old age dependency ratio increased from only 12% in
1950 to 21% in 2000 and 24% in 2010, raising pressing questions about issues such
as healthcare and retirement costs.
Recognizing the influence of population growth and age structure, economic the-
oreticians began to incorporate demographic structure to what became classical
macroeconomic models. Among the most notable of such works were those of Al-
lais [10] and Samuelson [88] who pioneered the so-called “Overlapping Generations
Model” (OLG) where the economy was seen through the lens of several generations,
and more importantly where the role of intergenerational transfers takes particular
prominence.
In Samuelson’s model [88], for instance, the fact that agents are driven by the desire
to smooth their intertemporal consumption, knowing their retirement obligation,
prompts a trade (or exchange) between generations at each point of time based on
the social contrivance of money, which unequivocally influences equilibrium interest
rates and savings. Inspired by this approach, Diamond [36] incorporated capital
into the OLG set-up and concluded that restoring consumption optimality, if not
through fiat currency, can also be achieved through public debt and Pay-As-You-
Go pension systems - both of which still forms of intergenerational transfers (see
Weil [96], and de la Croix and Michel [32] for further details).
These macro models were, in fact, preceded years earlier by a micro-based model
developed by Modigliani and Brumberg [72], now widely known as “life cycle theory”
who argued that individual choices of consumption and saving, based on known
periods of work and retirement, influence national savings and spur the exchange
between generations. This becomes particularly relevant for a growing population
where the savings of the young, who are continuously larger in number, exceed
the (dis)savings of the old, thus generating higher rates of economic growth (see
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Deaton [33] for more on the life cycle hypothesis).
Gradually, demography became an integral part of many more economic models,
deliberately incorporating age and death (or survival) rates as crucial elements.
Yaari [98] notably developed a life cycle model where the probability of survival is
deliberately included as an uncertainty that influences a consumer’s utility, asset ac-
cumulation and optimal consumption plan. Arthur and McNicoll [11] incorporated
for the first time detailed mathematical demography into an economic growth model
in order to obtain optimal savings and fertility paths. Their work emphasized the
importance of treating the population as a succession of life stages, each differing
in characteristics and economic behavior. A year later, they expanded Samuelson’s
model to also include this mathematical demography and showed more explicitly the
effect of intergenerational transfers in offsetting the decrease of capital per person
as the population grows at a constant rate (see Arthur and McNicoll [12]).
Given this context, Lee [54] and [55] published a comprehensive life cycle model that
looks at the aggregate consumption, savings, transfers and government debt based
on demographic tools, accounting for birth and survival rates and basing these on
individuals and households as the unit of analysis. Considered today as one of
the main building blocks of the NTA, Lee’s model drew a theoretical relationship
between intergenerational transfers and population growth, and between the latter
and overall economic growth. “If consumers are on average older than earners,”
he wrote, “then more rapid growth, by ‘younging’ the population, makes more
consumption possible.” From the individual’s point of view, a more rapid population
growth raises the interest rate; if people on average consume later than they earn,
a higher interest rate enables them to consume more. With higher population
growth rates, Lee’s model dictates that society must save more to avoid further
dilution of the capital-labor ratio. This theoretical framework has been expanded
in a series of articles and is still developing. Willis’s work [97] some years later, for
instance, concluded using many overlapping generations that equilibrium interest
rates would always exceed population growth rates, therefore hindering the idea
that money would be used as a store of value. D’Albis [29] has also recently shown
that capital dilution is not a definite consequence of population growth as it would
depend on the difference between the average age of those holding capital and the
average age of workers.
Economists also began to look empirically at the impact of age structure on general
economic growth and economic flows. Lindh and Malmberg [63], for instance, tested
the impact of age structure on economic growth using data from the OECD for the
period 1950-1990, in an age-structure augmented neoclassical growth model with
technical adjustment, and found that the expansion in size of the age group of 50-64
years old had a positive influence on overall economic growth, whereas that of the
age 65 years and older had a negative effect, and the very young had an ambiguous
effect that varied between countries. Bloom et al. [18], in their series of studies on
the impact of the demographic dividend on the economy, estimated that a third
of the growth of the Asian “miracle”economies was due to favorable age structure:
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the working-age population grew significantly as fertility rates declined and as both
young and old age dependency ratios decreased. A year later, Bloom et al. [19]
further generalized the importance of age structure on economic growth (and a
successful demographic dividend). They drew on a set of country experiences and
emphasized the role of an appropriate policy environment to reap the benefits of
favorable age structures.
Changing age structure, particularly with the looming retirement of the US baby
boomers, also motivated the investigation of its impact on asset returns. Brooks
[21], for instance, noted that asset returns moved with the baby boom generation,
putting them in a better-off position in terms of lifetime consumption despite lower
returns during their retirement age. Poterba [83], [84] and Abel [6] argued, on
the other hand, that there is little theoretical and empirical evidence of asset price
meltdowns as younger generations became smaller in size.
Amid this theoretical and empirical interest came the need for a relevant and en-
compassing database that links economic variables to past, present and future age
structures. The first of such age-structure driven databases is attributed to what
came to be called “Generational Accounting,”developed by Auerbach, Gokhale and
Kotlikoff in 1992 [14]. Driven by concerns about the coming retirement of the baby
boom generation in the US and consequent population aging, the authors proposed
the incorporation of generations’ present expected value of lifetime net payments
to the government into public deficits, public debt and general fiscal policy. This
approach, the authors argued, would allow for a better assessment of fiscal pol-
icy’s redistributive and savings effects on each generation’s financial receipts and
obligations, and therefore better estimating welfare effects.
Although the system of generational accounting has been applied to several country
cases by governmental and research institutions (for example Agulnik et al. [8],
Chojnicki and Docquier [25], Chojnicki and Rabesandratana [26], and more recently
Narayana [74]), there were several limitations that halted its wider implementation.
Among its key technical difficulties was the choice of the discount rate, for instance,
which is a debatable subject, particularly as the analysis extend further and further
into the future. Generational accounting, as noted by Kotlikoff [50], also does
not include general equilibrium effects of fiscal policies and therefore would offer
only an approximation of true welfare effects. A third relevant critique noted by
Haveman [44] emphasized the absence of individual behavioral change in response
to fiscal policies, such as the change of labor supply and the choice of bequest,
which thus limited the model to static effects. Neither does the system account for
private intergenerational transfers that can off-set fiscal policy.
The NTA project comes into this context to quantify the allocation of economic re-
sources between ages, in a unified and standardized manner. The National Transfer
Accounts introduce age to the aggregate data, therefore filling the gap that exists
in the System of National Accounts (SNA). It disaggregates its major components
of income, consumption and savings by age, and marks the essential role of inter-
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generational transfers.
These accounts, when completed, can shed light on the role of the institutions of
government, family and markets in the reallocation of resources across ages. The ac-
counts capture both public and private age reallocations and provide real estimates
of intergenerational flows - these flows that had been of interest to researchers and
policy makers for many decades as alternatives or complements to public policy.
The NTA, therefore becomes particularly useful when analyzing a wide range of
issues such as social security and pensions systems, human capital accumulation,
intergenerational equity and even migration, through a standardized dataset avail-
able for many countries around the world.
3 Method and Data
The National Transfer Accounts are based on an age-specific flow identity captur-
ing economic flows at each point in time. Variables are indexed by (x, t), which
respectively denote the age of an individual and the relevant time period. This flow
identity can be seen as an aggregate budget constraint for individuals of age x, as
is seen in life cycle models,
Y l(x, t) + Y k(x, t) + Y p+(x, t) + τ+(x, t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inflows
= C(x, t) + τ−(x, t) + Y p−(x, t) + S(x, t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Outflows
(1)
where Y l is the value of labor income inflow received for age (or age group) x at
time t, Y k is capital income inflow, Y p is property income flow, received as denoted
by (+) and spent as donated by (−), τ is the flow of transfers net of paid taxes 2
also received and spent, C is consumption and finally S is savings resulting from the
residual between the various types of income net of consumption. These variables
are the sum of both public and private flows, capturing at the same time those that
are domestic and international.
This flow identity can be re-arranged to show the economic life cycle for each age
and consequently the mechanism by which resources are reallocated across these
ages,
2Theoretically, the taxes that are included here are the ones used for public consumption and
public transfers, including pay-as-you-go pension systems, and do not include taxes applied to
interest payments, for example.
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C(x, t) − Y l(x, t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lifecycle Deficit
= τ+(x, t) − τ−(x, t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net Transfers
+ Y A(x, t) − S(x, t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Asset-based Reallocations︸ ︷︷ ︸
Age-Reallocations
(2)
This identity illustrates that the economic life cycle deficit (or surplus) is funded
by (or distributed through) transfers and asset-based reallocations for each age at
each point in time, where asset income inflow, denoted by Y A, is the sum of capital
and net property income.
The life cycle deficit is a key concept of the generational economy. It is the difference
between consumption and labor income for every relevant age (or age group), where
consumption includes households’ public and private consumption of various goods
and services, of which are public and private education and healthcare for example,
and where labor income encompasses employees’ earnings including fringe benefits,
as well as self-employment and unpaid family workers’ incomes.
The NTA traces the dynamics of this deficit through three distinct periods of indi-
viduals’ lives: life first begins with a deficit as children do not work, thus consume
more than they produce; this period is then followed by years of surplus as in-
dividuals enter working-age and begin to accumulate wealth, therefore producing
more than consuming; and finally a period where individuals fall back into deficit
as they enter retirement or continue to work but with earnings insufficient to cover
their consumption. Working age individuals, who enjoy life cycle surpluses, not
only fund their own consumption, but also provide transfers and asset based real-
locations for children and elderly. These stages differ between countries in size and
duration. Figure (1) shows the life cycle deficit for the for several economies around
the globe, expressed as a percentage of average labor income for those aged 30-49
years old3.
Transfers are defined as the flow of economic resources that are not quid pro quo,
meaning without any form of expected return or exchange. They can be in whatever
direction, from youth to old age or from old age to youth. Public transfers include
expenditure incurred by the government on public education, healthcare services
and unfunded pension plans, whereas private transfers include private education
and healthcare services for which individuals pay, in addition to various forms of
bequests and donations. However, whereas most forms of transfers are captured by
the NTA, bequests and inter vivos gifts are not yet accounted for due to difficulties
in measuring and quantifying them - while still acknowledging their importance as
a form of inter-generational transfers.
As for asset-based reallocations, the NTA defines them as economic sources that
can be accumulated and dis-accumulated and can yield some income for current
3Note that this age range is chosen so as to reduce the influence of educational and retirement
choices.
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Figure 1: Consumption, labor income and life cycle deficit, as a percentage of per
capita labor income of 30-49 year olds for four countries
Source: NTA database
and future generations. These reallocations are divided into capital and property
incomes. Capital income reallocations include reproducible material wealth and is
achieved through investments. Public capital includes building infrastructure, for
example, whereas private capital reallocations can be seen through the purchase of
housing units and consumer durables, through corporate profits, and through the
profits of business partnerships. These investments would have been made through-
out time and their income and benefits are theoretically reaped by individuals of
various ages. Capital is therefore a significant tool of reallocating resources and
assets across time and various ages. People may invest during their youth and reap
the profits of their investments (and dissave) during old age.
Table 1: A Classification of National Transfers Account Age Reallocation
Asset-based Reallocations
Transfers
Capital Property
Public Negligible
Public debt Public education
Student loans Public healthcare
Sovereign wealth funds Unfunded pensions
Currency destab. funds
Private
Housing Consumer debt Familial support
Consumer durables Land Charitable contributions
Corporate profits Sub-soil minerals Bequests
Partnerships, proprietorships
Source: [5]
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Finally, property (or Intertemporal Exchange) is associated with the trade of non-
reproducible economic resources, such as natural resources and interest from these
resources like rent and royalties. Public property income examples include public
debt, sovereign wealth funds and currency stabilization funds. Private property, on
the other hand, includes consumer loans, land and subsoil minerals such as gold.
The flow of individual savings, be them positive or negative, is part of asset-based
reallocations. Table 1 shows the classification of the various variables.
To better illustrate how transfers and asset-based reallocations fund the life cycle
deficit, Figure (2) shows the decomposition of this funding for every age in the
US, Costa Rica, France and India, corresponding to the life cycle deficit shown in
Figure (1). The figure illustrates that while the young depend primarily on public
and private transfers to fund their transfers, the elderly’s funding sources look less
uniform across these countries. Whereas French elderly depend significantly on
public transfers still, for example, the elderly in India barely use such a source,
and those in the US utilize more asset-based reallocations. In all countries, the
working-age populations are net-receivers of private asset-based reallocations to
various extents.
Figure 2: Funding the per capita life cycle deficit in several countries
Source: NTA database
To empirically capture the variables of the NTA flow identity, researchers rely upon
a set of country data sources. Household surveys, for example, and labor force
surveys in some cases, are used for the initial-level micro data. Together with
an extensive reliance on administrative records, they constitute the foundation of
the NTA. These surveys, often conducted consistently and representative of the
overall population, provide details on individuals such as their year of birth, their
consumption of private goods and services (by distinct categories), their paid taxes,
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the transfers that they make and receive, as well as details on sources and sums of
private income like wages, property income, dividends. . . etc. These rather detailed
surveys are used as a first step to construct consumption and income profiles by
age for the whole economy.
The NTA, however, uses additional assumptions to complete these profiles. An
equivalence scale, for instance, is used to allocate consumption from the household
level in the survey to the individual level. The scale begins at 0.4 for children aged
four years or younger, increasing linearly until the age of 20 to reach 1.0 and held
constant thereafter. Public expenditure on broad non-age related areas such as
defense and infrastructural projects, on the other hand, are presumed to be shared
equally among all individuals in society.
The Accounts also make several assumptions relating to income. First of which
is that labor earnings shown in these profiles (as well as consumption) are pre-
tax. Taxes, and subsidies, on products and services are allocated between these
components depending on the type of tax. For example, a value-added tax is a
consumption tax and is therefore included in consumption, whereas a payroll tax is
included in labor income.
The NTA also has to make several assumptions regarding self-employment income
and the income of unpaid family workers. Often times these incomes are captured
as a general household income in surveys and very commonly attributed to the
household head, therefore running the risk of underestimating the incomes of the
youth and possibly the elderly who have a higher likelihood of earning these types
of incomes. The Accounts, therefore, assume that self-employment income (and
unpaid family workers) is about two-third of mixed income as it appears in the
SNA (consistent with work done by Gollin [40]), with the last one-third treated
as capital income. This employment income is then allocated across those family
members who report themselves as self-employed or unpaid family workers. The
treatment of labor income in this sense in largely in line with the SNA.
Moreover, recognizing that some housing units are owner-occupied whereas others
are rented, the NTA estimates “imputed rent” for owner-occupied units and classi-
fies the flow of services from these units, captured through rental prices of similar
properties, as consumption. These imputations, sometimes already provided in
household surveys, ensure that housing unit expenditure is captured for all individ-
uals and households, regardless of whether the individual owns or rents, and are
incorporated at the same time as his/her private asset income.
To complete the picture, private savings are usually treated as a residual between
the life cycle deficit and age reallocations. The treatment of remittances, as part
of private transfers, on the other hand, differs based on whether the person is a
resident inside or outside the country: remittances from a worker that is considered
permanently abroad is included as an inflow from the rest of the world (ROW), for
example, whereas remittances from a resident who is temporarily abroad is included
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as labor income to the household to which they belong. The distinction between
the two is based on the country and depends on the length of the work contract of
the person living abroad.
At the same time, recognizing that surveys do not capture the full set of age-specific
flows, the NTA also relies on regression methods, especially in the estimation of
private and public education and healthcare consumption. Private education ex-
penditure, for instance, would be regressed on household member composition, ages
and dummies for enrollment in education. The coefficients of consumption could
be further restrained depending on the schooling system of the country (for exam-
ple if primary school is mandatory). Private healthcare expenditure, however, is a
more complicated estimate because surveys often include out-of-pocket expenditure
whereas the full extent of healthcare spending would require detailed information
from health care providers. The NTA nevertheless uses a similar method of re-
gressing household healthcare expenditure on household member composition, ages
and the number of inpatient and outpatient numbers within the household. Some
other methods are also used depending on the country and the extent of available
information.
For public education and healthcare, on the other hand, administrative records
make the most reliable source. Public education, for instance, is calculated as the
cost of school per child at each age times the enrollment rate (for more technical
detail detail, see the NTA Manual [5]).
The age profiles, per capita, thus, incorporate these assumptions and are then
smoothed to reduce data noise. The smoothed profiles are finally adjusted using
macro controls, meaning that they are essentially re-scaled with a case-based multi-
ple so that the NTA aggregates match the aggregate estimates of the SNA for each
country.
3.1 Support Ratios and the Demographic Dividend
The availability of age-specific data with the NTA allows for a more acute investi-
gation of the influence of age structure on various economic variables, compared to
more general measures such as dependency ratios. The support ratio (SR), which
is the ratio of the effective number of producers to the effective number consumers,
weighed by labor income and consumption, respectively, is one such measure that
the NTA data can quantify, and is considered a summary measure of the influence
of age structure on production and consumption - while holding other potential
factors constant such as effect on work effort, on interest rates, savings...etc. It es-
sentially captures the relationship between those who are supporting the economy
through production, to overall consumption, and can be defined as the following,
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SRt =
∑
x
yl(x, t0)N(x, t)∑
x
c(x, t0)N(x, t)
(3)
Where yl(a, t0) and c(a, t0) are per capita labor income and consumption for persons
of age (x) and at the base year t0. These variables, assumed time-invariant for the
purpose of this ratio, depend on a multitude of factors such as physiological needs
and abilities, culture, preferences, and in the case of labor also productivity. They
are then weighed by the historical and projected population of the relevant age at
each point of time N(a, t).
The support ratio can be used to determine the evolution of the demographic divi-
dend as Mason and Lee [66] illustrate. The authors argue that the first demographic
dividend occurs when the growth rate of effective producers exceeds the growth rate
of effective consumers, following g(SRt) = g(Y
l
t )− g(Ct), where Y l is the aggregate
labor income, and C is the aggregate consumption, and where a rise in the ratio
indicates a period of a “demographic window” during which countries have the op-
portunity to accrue more rapid growth. The impact of fertility decline that induces
this dividend on the standards of living can be assessed using this support ratio, as
well as other measures (Lee et al. [59]).
The support ratio is also a determinant of income per effective consumer in the
economy so that yt = SRty¯
l
t where y¯
l
t is income per effective worker. This is similarly
applied to consumption per effective consumer so that ct = SRtc¯t where c¯t denotes
consumption per effective worker. These equations can be expressed in terms of
growth rates as seen above to determine the extent of consumption and income
growth rates in relation to the growth rate of the support ratio.
The full extent of the demographic dividend, outside of these accounting effects, are
often assessed through lifetime savings and wealth effects, utilizing similar equa-
tions as seen above. The second demographic dividend, which takes into account
increased productivity levels in the economy, are also assessed using these wealth
effects, as in Mason and Lee [66] and Prskawetz and Sambt [85].
4 Key Findings
The creation of the National Transfer Accounts as a standardized and detailed
dataset spurred a number of country-specific and cross-country research that have
been able to trace general trends as well as peculiarities within countries.
The main findings of the NTA support, unsurprisingly, the intuition behind the life
cycle theory. That is, in all countries of the dataset the working age populations
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enjoy a life cycle surplus that not only funds their own consumption and savings,
but also aid, if not fully cover, the life cycle deficit of children and elderly through
transfers and asset-based reallocations.
Although no country steers away from this common picture, there exist some re-
gional trends. The duration in years in which a person enjoys a life cycle surplus,
for instance, and the ages at which he/she enters into and exists from this surplus
vary between countries and regions, reflecting among many things educational and
labor market differences (Table A1 in the Appendix shows this in detail).
An individual living in Europe and North America, for example, can expect to
start accumulating a life cycle surplus for the first time in his/her life around the
ages of 25-27 years old - this is a usually a few years after finishing secondary
and higher education. The only notable exception in the dataset for this region
is that of Austria where the age of entry into the life cycle surplus is around 23
years, influenced by the country’s strong apprenticeship culture that offers an earlier
opportunity into the labor force. These productive surplus years continue until
individuals in these countries arrive at their late 50s, at which point they transition
into an often well-established retirement program, making the duration of their
suplus over 30 years in total. Outside of this norm is Sweden, where an individual
exits the surplus and begins to accumulate later age deficits at the age of 63 years
old, reflecting workers’ longer stay in the labor market and bringing up the total
surplus span to 37 years, which is nearly half of life expectancy at birth for the
country.
This picture looks markedly different for some other countries. Whereas some Latin
American countries such as Peru and Uruguay have similar surplus spans to the
Western countries trend, Brazilians expect to produce more than they consume for
the first time at the age of 32 years old - an age that is exceeded by only Ghana in
the dataset - exiting this surplus at 59 and making their suplus duration no more
than 21 years. Mexico marks an extreme case of the shortest surplus duration of
only 16 years, where individuals re-enter into a deficit at the young age of only 49
years old. Asian and African countries do not have a markedly different trend from
that seen in Western countries.
However, while cut-off ages and surplus duration are critical for some age-specific
policy, they are not necessarily indicative of the extent of the surplus and its size
compared to the deficit for each individual during his/her lifetime (Figure 3). For
instance, while Italy, the UK and the US have similar surplus duration to other
Western countries, around 30-some years, an individual in those countries can cover
less than half of his/her lifetime deficit with this surplus, meaning a deficit-to-
surplus ratio of more than two - whereas a German, on the hand, produces more
than he consumes for a similar duration but is able to cover more than half his
lifetime deficit. Similarly, while the duration of life cycle surplus is about 40 years
in Colombia, one of the highest in the dataset, a Colombian still expects to make
the same deficit-to-surplus ratio as that incurred by a person in the Philippines
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who enjoys a surplus for a smaller period of 32 years, or a person in Ethiopia who
accumulates a surplus for only 30 years. China is the only country in the dataset
today where a person expects to make more life cycle surplus in his/her lifetime
than a deficit, noting a deficit-to-surplus ratio of 0.78 only, compared to the extreme
case of Mexico where this ratio stands at 19.5. Still, the data shows a generally
negative relationship between surplus span and the deficit-to-surplus ratio, meaning
that adding extra years of life cycle surplus, regardless of the sum earned in those
years, influences how much an individual is able to cover his/her lifetime deficit4.
Figure 3: Life cycle surplus span to lifetime deficit-to-surplus ratio, by country
Source: NTA Database
For country codes, refer to Table A2
The magnitudes of these life cycle deficits and surpluses are influenced by the levels
and trends of labor income and consumption, both of which considerably vary
between countries. Every country has its own set of labor market conditions, wages,
working hours, labor productivity, retirement, education and healthcare systems –
all of which plus more determine the extent of the deficit or surplus at every age.
A particular interest to a number of researchers has been the extent to which the
elderly can work, earn and contribute to overall labor income in the country. Lee
4Note that these are survival-weighed deficit-to-surplus ratios to better compare between coun-
tries with varying age-specific death rates.
14
and Ogawa [61] found significant differences among NTA countries in the elderly’s
share in total labor income for the countries. They found that while in countries
like Nigeria, Indonesia, the Philippines, Mexico and the US the elderly contribute
between 7-11% of overall labor income in their countries, in most other countries
and particularly European ones this share does not exceed 2%. In fact, the elderly
in the Philippines show a particularly high contribution to the country’s labor
income to a point of near self-sufficiency; their own labor and self-employment
earnings cover 73% of their consumption (Racelis and Salas [60]). The elderly in
Indonesia, despite improving pension and retirement systems, also highly depend
on their own labor income, both in rural and urban areas (Maliki [62]). In India,
Narayana [73] argues that the ability of the elderly to fund their own consumption
through informal employment and self-employment, particularly in agricultural and
service sectors, is a main contributor to the reduction of life cycle deficits of 60+
year olds. European countries, on the other hand, along with Japan and most other
NTA countries, have a rather small elderly share of total labor income, influenced
primarily by well-established and sometimes mandatory retirement system, as well
as tax systems that limit the extent of elderly labor force participation. Lee and
Ogawa [61] argue in the same paper that an increase in the retirement age, even
by as little as two years, can have significant effects on the life cycle deficit at later
ages in life, even in developing countries with high self-employment rates.
Indeed, with increasing life expectancy in most developed and now developing coun-
tries, Lee and Mason [68] argue that its effect on consumption is larger than on labor
income (or labor force participation), owing to some extent to non-changing retire-
ment ages, and in some cases early retirement options that limit the extent of labor
income later in life.
The size and type of consumption, which is the other contributor to life cycle
surpluses and deficits, also differ markedly between countries and towards which
age group it is mainly directed. While all age groups, for example, have more
private than public consumption per capita, the extent of the sectors’ contribution
to total per capita consumption varies. For children, defined as those aged 0-19
years old, the ratio of public consumption to total consumption per capita is much
higher than for the elderly or for the working-age population (Figure 4). This is
influenced by spending on education and early childhood healthcare. In Austria,
Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia and Sweden, this ratio of public-to-total
per capita consumption is more than 50%, with the highest being Sweden at 65%.
To the contrary, children in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Turkey and Vietnam have less than
20% of their total consumption from the public sector.
The elderly, on the other hand, depend far more on private consumption than on
public (Figure 5). More than a third of per capita consumption of the elderly
in Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Hungary, Slovenia and the UK come from
public consumption - with Sweden’s elderly depending on the public sector for more
than 65% of their consumption. Similar to the children’s age group, the elderly in
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Turkey and Vietnam barely have public consumption, with ratios
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less than 10% - indicating the importance of private consumption in sustaining their
living.
Figures (6) and (7) show the consumption of children and elderly as a ratio of the
consumption of the working-age population, in per capita terms and divided by
sector for each country. Points to the left the 45-degree diagonal line indicate that
children on average consume more than the elderly, and vice-versa for points to the
right of the line. Looking at the data in per capita terms is particularly useful here
to minimize the influence of each country’s age structure in the comparison.
While many developed countries still designate a larger proportion of their public
spending towards the children’s group than towards the elderly (take for example
Italy and France), in Thailand and Indonesia, children’s per capita public consump-
tion is more than twice that of the working-age, whereas their elderly consume
public goods and services less than 1.5 times the average public consumption of the
working-age. This is, as mentioned before, driven by investments in education that
are not, as Tung [94] argues, necessarily related to the income level of countries. It
is noticeable also that the majority of the countries to the left of the diagonal line
are generally developing nations with young populations, whereas those to the right
of the line are nations characterized by relatively older populations. Countries like
Nigeria, Brazil, Finland, Canada, Sweden and to some extent Japan fall almost on
the line. It is worth noting that consumption by age is reflective of the physiolog-
ical differences between the age groups - the fact that per capita consumption of
children is lower than that of adults, for example, is only natural.
Still, however, the elderly’s per capita private (and total) consumption as a ratio
of the working-age’s is much larger than that of children (Figures 7 and 8). Note,
for instance, the high average consumption of the elderly, compared to average
consumption of children, in countries like Japan, the USA, Brazil and Germany.
This is to a large extent a reflection of cultural and institutional norms of the
countries, but also of the availability and generosity of the public healthcare system
in the face of an aging population. In the case of France, D’Albis et al. [30] find
that while consumption gradually increases from the beginning of life until the age
of 17 years old, overall consumption has been relatively stable in the country for
many years, unlike many of its European neighbors. This is particularly attributed
to a change in the composition of consumption at old age from private to public,
influenced by the country’s encompassing public healthcare system.
This significant share of elderly consumption in all countries has triggered much
research on the elderly’s support systems. Indeed, how the elderly finance and sus-
tain themselves is of major concern, to both aging and currently young populations.
The three common tools to support the life cycle deficit, which the NTA allows to
quantify, are: public transfers, private (or familial) transfers and finally assets (or
asset-based reallocations). Figure (9)5 shows the extent to which every country’s
5The way to read a ternary diagram such as this, the reader must look at the side of the
triangle that is opposite the vertex of the relevant age-reallocation at it’s 100%, or 1. Each of
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Figure 4: Consumption by sector as a share of total for children (0-19 years old),
by country
Source: NTA Database
For country codes, refer to Table A2
elderly rely upon these tools, eliminating the influence of age structure on the data
and therefore allowing for a better comparison.
This diagram shows that the elderly in a significant number of countries in the
database are net givers of private, or familial, transfers. This includes countries
like Mexico, the USA, Spain, Uruguay, Germany, Peru and Brazil, whereas Asian
countries, on the other hand, rely more on familial transfers to fund their living
than others in Europe and Latin America.
Brazilian elderly, though net givers of these private transfers, depend almost exclu-
sively on public transfers to fund their living. This is a trend also seen in Peru,
Hungary, Slovenia, as well as Germany and Argentina. Public transfers as a funding
source, however, is meager in countries like Thailand and the Philippines, where
asset-based reallocations are close to zero. For South Koreans, the funding sources
are more equally split, with less than a third from family transfers, less than a
third from public transfers and a more than a third from asset-based reallocations.
Argentinian and Hungarian elderly, on the other hand, are net givers of asset-based
reallocations; they depend to a large extent on public transfers. Asian countries in
this dataset rely more on familial transfers than do other countries in Europe and
these vertices represents a full reliance on the funding source, with the other two sources equal to
zero. Points lying outside of the triangle means that the funding source is negative, i.e. that the
country’s elderly in this case are net givers of the source, not net takers.
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Figure 5: Consumption by sector as a share of total for the elderly (65+ years old),
by country
Source: NTA Database
For country codes, refer to Table A2
Latin America.
These support systems vary with public institutions and cultural norms within coun-
tries. Ogawa et al. [75], for instance, argue that there has been deteriorating family
support in Japan over the past few decades, with decreasing three-generational
co-residence. Healthcare reforms also allowed for the insurance coverage of old-age
care therefore alleviating the burden on children to care for their elderly. In Taiwan,
despite the significant family support system, Tung and Lai [95] find that the type
of support received by the elderly can vary with their residence situation. Elderly
residing with children, for instance, which is the case for about 60% of the elderly
in the country, depend more on intra-familial transfers, whereas those residing with
their spouses or grandchildren (what they call third generation) depend on their
own asset resources. Those residing alone receive the majority of their income sup-
port from the government. In India, Ladusingh and Narayana [51] highlight the
elderly’s role in giving intra-household transfers, and the extent to which they still
depend on their own labor and asset income to support their consumption. Indian
elderly, in fact, rely very little on public transfers, and are in many cases negative
net public transfers recipients due to the amounts of direct and indirect taxes that
they have to pay (Narayana [73]).
In the majority of countries, the elderly continue not only to save, as is in line with
previous works and findings, but also to be net givers of private transfers to younger
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Figure 6: Per capita public consumption of children and elderly as a ratio of per
capita consumption of the working-age population, by country
Source: NTA Database
For country codes, refer to Table A2
generations. In Lee and Mason [58], intergenerational private transfers continue to
be strongly downward (from old to young) in every society. Lee and Donehower [56]
find that the majority of private transfers are inter-household transfers, with some
importance given to remittances in countries like the Philippines and Chile where
the elderly share the amounts they receive while continuing to work at later stages
of their lives. In Brazil, where the elderly are the largest net givers in fact, the
authors argue that some children move in with their parents and are likely to receive
transfers. The size of these private transfers differs between regions: rich Western
nations make private transfers that are close to 25% of GDP, whereas Southeast
Asian countries transfer higher amounts, of about 40%.
The direction of public transfers, on the other hand, differs between countries and
regions [58]. South, Southeast and East Asia, as well as the US, all have a downward
flow of public transfers, meaning from the old to the young, whereas European
countries and Japan have an upward flow. However, when weighed by the age
distribution of the countries, public transfers remain downward in Asian countries
only. The direction of the flow, the authors argue, is related to the country’s
economic development and to the type and coverage of its pension institutions as
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Figure 7: Per capita private consumption of children and elderly as a ratio of per
capita consumption of the working-age population, by country
Source: NTA Database
For country codes, refer to Table A2
is framed by the state.
In fact, Miller [71] found a rise in the role of the state when it comes to real-
locating public intergenerational transfers in most of the NTA countries, with a
general increase in the weight of the public sector in the economy. The author
shows that there exists a strong positive correlation between public transfers given
to the elderly and those given to children - which is contrary to the intuition that
governments respond to changes in age structures by reallocating resources between
the two dependent groups. Miller argues that this may be due to political pressure
on governments to increase taxes and give more to dependent groups, particularly
as those groups cooperate to combat low income levels. South Korea is the only ex-
ample that the author finds where the state responded to its changing age structure
by switching from the emphasis on education spending for children to healthcare
spending for the elderly.
Patxot et al. [77] marked the generosity of the Spanish public transfers for the el-
derly, in what they call “backward intergenerational family transfers”, despite the
fact that these elderly also receive significant family transfers. This long-standing
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Figure 8: Per capita total consumption of children and elderly as a ratio of per
capita consumption of the working-age population, by country
Source: NTA Database
For country codes, refer to Table A2
skewed government policy, the authors argue, might have contributed to lower fer-
tility rates for Spain with the financial burden increasing on younger generations.
Mason et al. [69] point to a trade-off between transfers (particularly public transfers)
and asset-based reallocations, especially for the elderly. Middle-income countries
and countries with weaker social welfare systems tend to rely more on asset-based
reallocations. High fertility countries, and countries with higher cost per child such
as Latin American countries, also have a higher reliance on assets to fund their own
consumption and to fund some transfers. The authors also argue that the level of
economic growth influences the extent of these flows, so that when the ratio of asset
income to savings is high in the economy, the reliance on asset-based reallocations
increases.
The extent of this reliance varies between countries, however. The largest flows are
seen in Mexico and Indonesia (about 2/3 of total factor income), and a little less
than two-thirds for the USA and the Philippines. In Sweden and Austria, asset-
based flows are almost negligible. In proportion to the average labor income of 30-49
year olds, Brazil’s asset based reallocations are the highest, about 21 times, with
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Figure 9: Sources of funding the life cycle deficit for persons 65 years and older for
21 countries, as a share of life cycle deficit
Source: NTA Database
For country codes, refer to Table A2
13.5 times in Latin America in general, whereas it is 6.9 times in Asian countries
and only 2.8 times in Western nations.
Recognizing the tradeoff between transfers and asset-based reallocations, and rec-
ognizing in turn that these reallocations are the only source of productive flows that
can induce economic growth, Sanchez-Romero et al. [92] argue that the aggregate
stock of capital in Spain would increase until a peak in 2040, but deplete quickly af-
terwards. This is due to two linked phenomena: the first is when the baby boomers
use their own personal incomes and the generosity of the Spanish transfers systems
to save, and the second is when the “baby bust” generation receive these savings
in inter vivos transfers, but consume them rapidly. The authors argue that when
individuals expect more transfers received than paid, as would be the case for the
baby bust generation in Spain, the economy would see a depletion of capital as
individuals lose the incentive to save.
5 Limitations and Challenges
The National Transfer Accounts allows economists, demographers, researchers and
public policy makers to look at economic behavior and the evolution of economic
flows in relation to age structure of not only their own countries, but also an increas-
ing set of countries. The project, though itself is relatively young, has been able
to produce numerous research papers and continues to contribute to understanding
the impact of aging on the broader economy. It nevertheless naturally faces several
limitations and challenges.
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A first and perhaps most clear limitation is that the NTA age profiles are a cross-
sectional analysis of individuals of various ages at a certain point in time. While
they can be used to construct pseudo-cohort datasets, they do not trace the same
cohorts throughout their lives. Over the years these profiles change, in response to
differing economic and non-economic circumstances (see, Donehower [37] for U.S.
profiles from 1888 to 2003, Racelis and Salas [60] for the Philippines from 1994 to
2002, and a brief note by Lindh et al. [64] for Sweden from 1800 to 2009). This
means that the cross-sectional characteristic of the profiles limits the extent by
which they can be seen as forecasts of economic behavior for future generations.
The extent and availability of survey data in every country also has significant im-
pact on the construction of the profiles. The more representative, frequent and
detailed the surveys are, the more accurate the profiles would become and the less
re-scaling would be required. A technical critique of the NTA includes the fact
that even with relatively representative surveys the number of observations for each
age is not large, therefore limiting the accuracy of the results and the extent by
which they can be generalized. The move from survey outcomes to aggregate re-
sults that match the SNA is also ridden with technical assumptions. For instance,
while the NTA uses a smoothing technique to construct the final age profiles (usu-
ally Friedman’s Supersmoother), the general smoothing idea can be in some cases
inadvisable because the discontinuity of the variables is by itself a distinct feature
of some transfers such as retirement - making it important to preserve (refer to
the NTA Manual [5] Appendix B.1. for a further discussion on the role and rules
of the NTA’s smoothing technique). The NTA also uses a multiplicative factor to
re-scale the results to the SNA aggregate, a method that proportionally alters the
age-profiles.
Recognizing the limitation of the data, the NTA needs to make several assumptions
to bridge the gap, some of which are contestable. Although some variables in the
data are individually assigned, some are attributed to the household, for example.
The Accounts assume that some economic flows are received and handled by the
household head, especially when individually-assigned data are not available. All
assets are assumed to be held, and distributed, by the household head. Although
these are simplifying and sometimes necessary assumptions, they nevertheless risk
biasing the data by gender and by age.
The NTA also assumes, again due to the lack of better data, a common sharing rule
for the consumption of goods and services inside the household. Rarely do surveys
attribute private consumption to each individual and by each age. The sharing
rule that the NTA assumes applies to all goods and services, to all households and
for all countries. This may be a wry assumption. Some goods and services, for
instance, favor one age group over another, other goods and services may favor one
gender over the other. Some goods are exclusive to certain members and others are
nonexclusive. Chiappori [23] also argued that the sharing rule would also depend on
all prices of goods and services and all incomes in the household – all of which greatly
differ between countries. It is influenced by the egoistic or altruistic preferences of
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members of the family and how sharing goods within the households factors into
their utility function.
In Browning et al. [22], sharing rules can also be seen as the relative bargaining
power of each member within the household, which in turn influences levels and
composition of household consumption. This bargaining power is itself a product of
several factors such as the marriage market and divorce legislation (see Chiappori et
al. [24] and Gray [41]), labor market opportunities and the structure of the welfare
state (Iversen and Rosenbluth [48]), wage rates (Pollak [82]) and various others,
all of which are not the same across countries, nor within countries in some cases.
Much research has argued, for instance, that subsidies that target women impact
significantly household consumption (see Lancaster et al. [52] on Indian women’s
bargaining power and consumption in general, Osmani [76] on the influence of mi-
crocredit for women on household consumption, Attanasio et al. [13] and Shultz [89]
on Mexico’s Progresa program, Gitter and Barham [39] on women’s cash transfers
in Nicaragua, and Rawlings and Rubio [87] for general impact of subsidies on bar-
gaining power of women within the household). Moreover, economies of scale differ
between households and countries. Deaton and Paxson [34] found that per capita
demand for food decreases with household size, especially in poor countries. Coun-
tries of the NTA do not have the same residence and co-habitation situations. This
influences the sharing rule and influences overall consumption and utility. All of
this research prompts the need for more rigorous and country-specific sharing rules
(see also Lee et al. [57] for an extended discussion on this subject).
This highlights the importance of understanding household decision-making, which
consequently influences individual profiles. Shultz [90] argued, for instance, that
among the conceptual difficulties of the NTA is the lack of a behavioral model of
family formation, of labor supply, fertility, and consequent human capital invest-
ment, and of savings and consumption. Incorporating such a model, a challenge
in itself, could better quantify the consequences and extent of phenomena such as
the demographic dividend in various countries as well as the real evolution of age
profiles.
Increasingly discussed today are also issues relating to the quantification of home
production and time transfers – both of which are neither included in the SNA
nor the NTA. Although there may be some technical difficulties of quantifying
these measures, it is clear to researchers their importance in accurately depicting
economic flows, particularly at older ages.
Gronau [42], for example, found that the value of American womens’ home pro-
duction in 1973 exceeded 60% of the family’s money income before tax, and 70%
after tax. When the woman joined the market the loss of home production was
almost equal to her monetary income. Using more recent data, House et al. [45]
found that the value of foregone home production stood at about 25% of women’s
earnings in the U.S. during the 1990s and early 2000s as women moved towards
more labor force participation. Moreover, although Ramey [86] shows that home
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production hours have decreased over time, she emphasized notable difference be-
tween rural and urban areas, the category of home production itself, the age group
of the women, their employment and marriage status.
The absence of home production in the NTA profiles then can seriously under-
estimate the age profiles, particularly for women and increasingly for the elderly.
Home production, for example, has been used to explain the so-called “retirement-
consumption puzzle,” where it was noted that despite the seeming drop of the
elderly’s consumption post-retirement, the time that they spent at home producing
food and performing various other activities within the household effectively sus-
tained their consumption levels by relying on different sources (Aguiar and Hurst [7]
and Hurst [47]). The absence of home production in the profiles can also blind the
NTA from some of its other important consequences. Zick et al. [100] and Frazis and
Stewart [38], for example, argued that household production can decrease income
equality between households. Devereux and Locay [35] argued that the absence of
home production in economic growth measures biased these measures upwards6.
Time transfers between individuals and households, on the other hand, has also at-
tracted much attention in the past few years, known within the NTA framework as
the NTTA (National Time Transfer Accounts). Although it has been theoretically
developed by Becker [16] a number of decades ago, the availability of empirical tools
to measure the allocation of time has been limited to infrequent time diaries and
very specific surveys. Their importance, however, is increasing with the retirement
of the elderly in Western countries and within communities of higher family net-
work. Zagheni and Zannella [99], for example, observed a large time transfer from
females to males in general and from adults to children, in the 21, mostly Western,
countries of the Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS). They also noted significant
differences between countries: Italian women with 1 or more young children, for in-
stance, dedicate far more time to household production than French women during
their 20s. Albertini et al. [9], using the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE) for the year 2004, found a strong net downward trend of transfers
from elderly in children, not only in financial transfers but also in time transfers.
These transfers differed between country groups, their welfare regimes and what the
authors call their “generational contract”. They also noted that “younger” elderly
groups, particularly during the first years of retirement, tend to give more time and
financial support to their children and grandchildren, although 70-year-olds and
older remain net givers to their families.
These differences highlight the importance of incorporating time flows into the
NTA. Phananiramai [80], indeed, attempts to incorporate time into the NTA of
Thailand, and proposes a modified NTA balancing equation, associating time with
a certain monetary value. She finds that women in the Thai community remain
net providers of time throughout most of their lives, working mostly on household
6The decrease of home production throughout the 19th century has contributed to some re-
duction in per capita output, which when included in economic growth measures suppresses real
growth.
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maintenance. Although 30-40 year-olds were the main net providers of household
time, those between 50-68 years old were the main net providers of community
service. Care for children, the author argues, constitutes about 67% of total intra-
household transfers, and children are the most demanding of time. This emphasizes
the role of time transfers for young populations especially, and warrants significant
differences between the NTA countries.
Moreover, the NTA profiles as they stand today remain gender-neutral. Part of the
challenge of segregating by gender is the need for even more assumptions and more
detailed data. Still, this gender-neutrality masks part of the picture. Hammer et
al. [43], for example, suggest a markedly different picture of the life cycle deficits
between men and women. Utilizing the NTA database and the EU Statistics on
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), the authors find that labor income profile
for women is noticeably less than that of men, with the exception of Slovenia and
to some extent Sweden, Finland and Hungary. Female contribution to total labor
income ranges from a low of 24% in Italy and the UK to about 41% in the Sweden,
reflecting female labor force participation and income at various ages, in addition to
family policies within each country. Female contribution in non-market goods and
services, on the other hand, exceeds that of men in almost all countries. Gender
segretation is, of course, possible, but remains a challenge for the project.
Mason and Lee [67] also note that the NTA lacks “green accounting,” meaning that
while it measures savings and asset-based reallocations, for example, it does not take
into account the degradation of the environment that often comes with economic
growth. This degradation influences future savings and consumption behavior, as
well as labor income potential. The level of degradation also varies between coun-
tries. It is difficult, however, from a data and theoretical limitation perspective,
to incorporate this in the NTA today, not to mention that this subject by itself
requires further research.
A final point of contention, and still a theoretical and empirical challenge, is the
incorporation of inheritance into the economic flows between individuals. Although
the data for inheritance remain scant and unreliable for many countries, their mag-
nitude in the economy is large. Piketty [81], for example, estimated the inheritance
flow, which includes both bequest and inter vivos gifts, to have been about 15% of
France’s GDP in 2010, with a forecast of 20-25% in a few decades. Sanchez-Romero
et al. [91] estimated Japan’s inheritance flow, using a Computed General Equilib-
rium (CGE) model, to have been about 8-12% of GDP in 2000 with a forecast of
14-26% in the year 2100.
These works, though crucial and significant, emphasize still the scarcity of the avail-
able data for the framework of the NTA. Except for some rare cases, the estimates
on inheritance often relied upon specific and short-period surveys. Menchik [70], for
instance, used a specific year data drawn from the Inheritance Tax Division of the
Connecticut State Department to ascertain equal bequest and inheritance between
generations; Davies [31] based his simulations on inheritance data that were derived
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from the American Survey Research Center’s 1960 “Income and Welfare” survey;
Bernheim et al. [17], who introduced a strategic bequest model, and Hurd [46], who
introduced a model of bequest motive to explain elderly income and consumption,
both relied on the American Longitudinal Retirement History Survey, which was
limited to the period 1969-1979; and Perelman and Pestieau [79] used a limited 5,600
French household survey conducted by INSEE in 1986, based on yes-no questions.
However, many the NTA challenges can be overcome with further research and
more accurate survey; research that is already being worked on and published where
authors use multiple years of analysis for comparison and where even more special
attention is placed on the generational economy as a whole (see for example, Patxtot
et al. [78] and the special edition of the Journal of the Economics of Ageing titled
Exploring the Generational Economy).
6 Concluding Remarks
This article attempted to give a comprehensive picture of the National Transfer
Accounts (NTA): the theoretical and conceptual origins upon which it relies, the
key findings of the numerous teams around the world who applied the NTA methods
to their own countries and allowed a larger comparative understanding of economic
flows between generations, and finally the limitations and challenges that await to
be delved into and improved upon.
The further development of the NTA as a powerful empirical tool to understand
the generational economy depends upon continuing to build a global database that
would not only enhance our knowledge of generational flows but would also be
opened for researchers in all fields, stirring the type of public debate that would
implement more effective public policy for current and future generations.
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Table A.1: Ages of entry into and exit from life cycle surplus and surplus year-span,
by country
Country Entry Exit Span
Africa
Ethiopia 29 59 30
Ghana 35 63 28
Kenya 25 57 32
Mozambique 27 60 33
Nigeria 29 61 32
Senegal 25 67 42
South Africa 30 60 30
Asia
Cambodia 22 47 25
China 23 60 37
India 26 60 34
Indonesia 29 59 30
Japan 26 60 34
Philippines 27 60 33
South Korea 24 56 32
Taiwan 24 55 31
Thailand 26 58 32
Turkey 29 64 35
Vietnam 23 54 31
Europe and North America
Austria 23 59 36
Canada 29 60 31
Finland 26 60 34
France 25 57 32
Germany 27 58 31
Hungary 25 59 34
Italy 27 59 32
Slovenia 25 56 31
Spain 26 59 33
Sweden 26 63 37
UK 25 58 33
USA 26 60 34
Latin America and the Carribean Argentina 23 61 38
Brazil 32 53 21
Chile 26 54 28
Colombia 22 62 40
Costa Rica 27 55 28
Jamaica 23 57 34
Mexico 33 49 16
Peru 27 57 30
Uruguay 29 59 30
Oceania Australia 24 59 35
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Table A.2: Country names, abbreviations and year of data
Argentina ARG 1997
Australia AUS 2004
Austria AUT 2005
Brazil BRA 1996
Canada CAN 2006
Cambodia KHM 2009
Chile CHL 1997
China CHN 2002
Colombia COL 2008
Costa Rica CRI 2004
Ethiopia ETH 2005
Finland FIN 2004
France FRN 2005
Germany DEU 2003
Ghana GHA 2005
Hungary HUN 2005
India IND 2004
Indonesia IDN 2005
Italy ITA 2008
Jamaica JAM 2002
Japan JPN 2004
Kenya KEN 2005
Mexico MEX 2004
Mozambique MOZ 2008
Nigeria NGA 2004
Peru PER 2007
Philippines PHL 1999
Senegal SEN 2005
Slovenia SVN 2004
South Africa ZAF 2005
South Korea KOR 2000
Spain ESP 2000
Sweden SWE 2003
Taiwan TWN 1998
Thailand THA 2004
Turkey TUR 2006
United Kingdom GBR 2010
United States of America USA 2003
Uruguay URY 2006
Vietnam VNM 2008
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